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1 otherwise 0 and the logistic regression is used in the study. Estimate from 
several versions of the logistic probability model indicates that the 
likelihood of failure and distress decrease with increase in liquidity holding 
while capital ratios are not significant. Results support the Basel lll stance 
that the NSFR has the inverse relation with the bank failure and distress. 
Comparison between NSFR-10 and NSFR-14 is also done and the analysis 
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failure of the banks are also discussed. 
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1. Introduction  
Financial institution plays an important role in the development of the economy. Financial crisis 
highlights the deficiencies of the banking industry therefore there is a need to introduce the specific bank 
model that helps the banks to maintain the stability even during the financial crisis (Saba et al, 2012, 
2015Capital and liquidity ratios, both are important for the stability of the banking industry. If these ratios 
are good, then the chances of the bank failure decrease many folds. Safety and soundness of the banks 
increase due to well managed capital and liquidity ratios. These two ratios minimize the different types of 
risk; insolvency risk decreases by the capital ratio and market risk decrease by the liquidity ratio. 
Appropriately liquid and better-capitalized banks are considered sounder.  
 
Ideally, researchers use micro data to study how banks can respond to Basel III liquidity requirements. 
According to Basel Committee for Banking Supervision’s (BCBS) Quantitative Impact Survey (QIS) in 
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2009, only two-third of the 263 banks surveyed were able to calculate the NSFR and the remaining could 
not calculate the ratio (BCBS, 2010c). Basel III will be fully applied in 2018. Therefore, it is important to 
do research on this important topic and collect data about the calculation of the NSFR and LCR. 
 
Basel III is a reform plan announced by the BCBS to address vulnerabilities that were exposed to the 
crisis (BCBS, 2010).  LCR and NSFR are the two prickliest elements. Structural change in the Bank risk 
profile occurs due to the funding risk that are defined by the Net Stables Funding Ratio, it also defines the 
short-term funding ratio and long-term funding ratios. Banks that do not gather the NSFR need to 
decrease assets that require stable funds and raise their stable source of funding (King at all, 2013) 
 
NSFR standard of sustainability and long-term stable funding debt crisis and LCR standard for the cash 
flow crisis, the bank requires maintaining sufficient liquid assets to cover the required 30 days of crisis. 
Basel capital rules to achieve the liquidity of assets for short-term service contracts in the traditional focus 
on the rules.  
 
The recent global financial crisis proves the importance of liquidity risk for the stability of the financial 
sector. The crisis leads to a new financial regulation, Basel III (in response to the open market failure of 
the BCBS). Basel III introduced a global minimum standard for liquidity, liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) 
and net stable funding ratio (NSFR). LCR hopes banks will have enough liquid assets to carry on the 
business in one month. NSFR is based on long term duration. Both LCR and NSFR are coming through 
the current observation period.  
 
Financial institutions such as banks deal with a lot of risk. In this case, risk management plays crucialrole 
and help banks maintain adequate capital liquidity. The banks do not forget the limits for the debt. The 
goal is to ensure that the banks remains trustworthy for customers and government agencies even when 
the bank is in hot water. During the global economic crisis of 2008, organization has provided an 
opportunity for reconstruction of the banking business model. Basel Committee on the financial risk and 
regulatory perspective BCBS (Banking Supervision) reached to an agreement to change regulations for 
the banking industry. Hence,BCBS is not only just providing the benchmark ratios to the banks but also 
monitoring the performance of the banks. This committee allows the banks to discuss the issue related to 
their operations to increase the quality of the banks.  
 
This paper discusses the minimum level of the liquidity ratios (King, 2013; Dietrich et al., 2014; Hong et 
al., 2014) and examines the effects of the Basel III on bank capital and liquidity ratios that are helpful for 
decreasing the failure and distress of the Pakistani banks. The relation between the newly established 
measures of the banks liquidity structure, (NSFR) the Net Stable Funding Ratio and the bank probability 
of failure and distress is studied in this paper. The research also focusses on the relation between the Net 
Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR,2010) and probability of failure and distress of the banks and further check 
the relation between the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR,2014 with the failure and distress of the banks 
of the Pakistani economy). 
 
1.1 Basel III capital and liquidity requirement 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision provides a forum for regular cooperation on banking 
supervisory matters. Its objective is to enhance understanding of key supervisory issues and improve the 
quality of banking supervision worldwide.  
 
BCBS published the first capital agreement in 1988 known as Basel I. The major attention of the Basel 
agreement was to assist international banks against credit risk. The agreement established minimum 
percentage requirement of risk weighted asset to the bank total capital (Santos, 2001).  The revision of the 
agreement was done in 1997 to incorporate market risk, such as interest rate and foreign exchange risk in 
the risk-weighted capital requirement asset account. Basel I after the round of discussions by central 
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bankers from all over the world was published again and known  as the 1988 Basel Accord and was 
enforced by law in 1992.  
 
Basel II initially published in June 2004 with the intention to amend international standards t to control 
how much capital banks need to hold to guard against the financial and operational risks faced by the 
banks. Basel II uses a "three pillars" concept: 
 
(1) Minimum capital requirements (addressing risk) 
(2) Supervisory review and  
(3) Market discipline. 
One of the main criticismon Basel II was that it does not focus on the micro-prudential regulation and the 
bank level stability. The situation leads to “too big to fail” and gave rise to the incidents occurring due to 
moral hazard problem in the banking industry (Schwerter, 2011). Ashraf and Godard (2012),mentioned 
that, investment in the capital market may remove the risk from the banking sector for an investor with 
the global financial system. 
 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009exposed the limitation of the existing banking regulatory 
framework because of the need to re asses the Basel II accord. This re-evaluation of the regulatory 
framework of the banking industry revealed a serious shortcoming and beginning of a new structure. This 
new structure is known as Basel III accord. Basel III was developed in response to the financial crisis 
2007. Basel III is an international regulatory agreement that introduced a set of reforms designed to 
improve the regulation, supervision and management within the banking sector. Largely in response to 
the credit crisis, banks are required to maintain proper leverage ratios (i.e. LCR) and meet certain 
minimum capital requirements (i.e. NSFR). 
 
For strengthening the capital requirements, the Basel III framework introduces a non-risk weighted ratio, 
which is designed to integrate the minimum risk of capital requirements to insure the stability of the 
banks. In the crisis the fund will be retained stable 3%, based on risk which is used as back up the step 
listed above. In addition, BCBS (2010) prepared two regulatory measures of liquidity LCR and NSFR. 
The goal is to ensure that banks have enough liquid assets to face pressure in short term cash and NSFR 
for the long-term support. (BCBS,2014). 
 
The calculation of the NSFR is the Available Stable Funding (ASF) to the amount of the Required Stable 
Funding (RSF): 
     
   
   
 
The ASF includes the portion of the capital and liabilities whereas the RSF include the portion of the asset 
in the off-balance sheet items(BCBS,2014). For example, the NSFR consider the long-term liabilities are 
more stable as compared to the short-term liabilities and short-term retail deposits are more stable as 
compared to the wholesale funding. 
 
Banks can easily meet the requirement of the NSFR ratios by increasing the ASF and by decreasing the 
RSF(King, 2013). These all activities impact on the banks liquidity management function and focus on 
the holding of the liquid asset specially government securities. Covasand Driscoll (2014) suggested that 
the Basel III introduce the minimum liquidity requirement for the banks, so the introduction of the 
minimum liquidity requirement decreases a loan by 3 percent and increase the securities by 6 percent. 
Banks can meet the requirement of the NSFR by decreasing the illiquid and risky asset and replace with 
the liquid asset that helps to strengthen the capital ratio. 
BCBS introduced the principles for sound liquidity risk management and supervision, which provide 
guidance on the risk management and supervision of funding liquidity risk. For improving the liquidity 
framework, the committee develops two standards for funding and liquidity, to ensure that banks have 
enough high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) to survive in the stress scenario for 30 days.  
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The proxy used in the study is LCR the result of the study is consistent with the results of Hong et al, 
(2014). LCR is basically usedto ensure that a solvent bank survives a short-term liquidity issue but in case 
of any problem this can help to eliminate the problem. 
 
Capital and liquidity are bothnecessary for the stability of the banks. Banks seek an optimal combination 
of capital and liquidity for minimizing the banks risk and financial distress. 
 
2. Literature Review 
A valuable regulatory tool for the safety and soundness of the banks is capital ratio.CAMELS rating used 
for evaluating the safety and soundness of the banks especially in the US.Different scholars used capital 
adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earning quality and sensitivity as an interpreter of bank 
failure. During the saving and loan crisis of 1980s and in early 1990s US financial institution used the 
same data (Cole &Gunther, 1995; DeYoung, 2003; Estrella et al., 2000; Wheelock & Wilson, 2000). In 
the recent years many financial institutions used the same framework for the analysis of banks during the 
global financial crisis (Altunbas, Manganelli, & Marquez-Ibanez, 2015; Cole & White, 2012; DeYoung 
&Torna, 2013). 
 
These studies detect that heavy reliance on short term market funding and aggressive loan growth are the 
main reasons of bank failure and non-performing loans, low capitalization and low profitability and this 
shows the risk to the banks. Literature identify that the better capitalized banks perform better during the 
global financial crisis. Leverage ratio is a good proxy for measuring the capital rather than the risk 
adjusted capital ratio (Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, and Merrouche (2013)) Beltratti and Stulz (2012). 
High capital and low capital both situations encourage banks to take more risk so the relationship between 
capital and risk is nonlinear (Altunbas et al., 2015). Researchers identified a positive relation between 
capitals and risk (Delis and Staikouras,2011). Latest studies focus on the Basel III capital ratios to 
decrease the bank failure ratio (Vazquez and Federico,2015). Studies show the relation between structural 
liquidity and leverage during the global financial crisis of successive failure. Banks that have lower 
liquidity and higher leverage ratio in the pre-crisis period were expected to fail after the crisis period and 
the US & European banks concentrate on these two ratios during the period of 2001 to 2009. Using the 
sample of US commercial banks Hong et.al checked the relation between Basel III liquidity risk measure 
and bank failure over the period of 2001 to 2011. They discovered that the percentage of the bank failure 
is partially affected by the NSFR and LCR. The literature indicates that the Basel III liquidity and capital 
ratios are still developing. Based on existing literature, the research is conducted to find that the capital 
and liquidity ratio decrease the bank failure or not. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
This study focusses on the banks, both distress and active banks. Data was collected from the bank’s 
annual reports. The analysis focusses only on those banks with available data to compute variable of 
interest (the Basel III capital and liquidity ratios). The data was used for the calculation of the Basel III 
capital and liquidity ratios in terms of balance sheet items and specifically in the form of ratios of the 
balance sheet. During the data collection process, the following problems were faced (i) Annual reports 
were not prepared according to BCBS requirements (ii) In annual reports, data was not categorized. All 
the categories were treated under the one main head. Simply because these requirements were not 
necessary before the new regulation proposed by the BCBS (2010). Over all, sample includes 30 banks, 
with the observation 180 years in total. Due to unavailability of the data some bankswere dropped. The 
final sample comprise is of 21 banks with the 126 observations in total.  
 
The selected sample is of Pakistani banking industry. Annual reports of the banks, reports published by 
the central bank of Pakistan and interviews of the banking professionals were main source of data 
collection for the study.banking.Different proxies areused in the study for the capital ratios (ETA, 
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TIER1RATIO, TRCR) to check the relation with the different combination of the capital and structure 
liquidity ratio and capital ratio with the bank failure and distress. 
 
3.4 Empirical Methodology 
The logistic model is used to check the relation between bank failure and Basel III liquidity and capital 
measure. Logit models have been extensively used in the literature (Kumar et al., 2003; Kalotychou 
(2006); Fuertes and Kalotychou, 2007; Davis and Karim, 2008; Poghosyan and Čihak, 2011; LoDuca and 
Peltonen, 2013; Sarlin and Peltonen, 2013; and Betz et al., 2014).  Fuertes, Davis and Karim (2008) 
discussed the appropriateness of this approach. To check the importance of the different independent 
variables (NSFR-14, NSFR-10 and LCR) and capital ratios (ETA, TIER1RATIO and CAR) that how 
these variables impact on the failure and distress of the banks, the logit regression with the combination of 
different variables is used.  The models have the following functions: 
 
Equation # 01 
191817
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In equation 1 the capital ratios, Equity to total asset (ETA) and Tier 1Ratio, one of the structure liquidity 
ratio NSFR14 and other independent variables, bank specific and macroeconomic variables are used 
Equation # 02 
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In equation 2 the capital ratios, Equity to total asset (ETA) and CAR, one of the structure liquidity ratio 
NSFR14 and other independent variables, bank specific and macroeconomic variables are used for the 
regression. 
Equation # 03 
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In equation 3 the capital ratios, Equity to total asset (ETA) and TIER1RATIO, one of the structure 
liquidity ratio NSFR10 and use other independent variables, bank specific and macroeconomic variables 
are used for the regression. 
Equation # 04 
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In equation 4 the capital ratios, Equity to total asset (ETA) and CAR, one of the structure liquidity ratio 
NSFR14 and other independent variables, bank specific and macroeconomic variables are used for the 
regression. 
Equation # 05 
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In equation 5 the capital ratios, Equity to total asset (ETA) and TIER1RATIO, one of the structure 
liquidity ratio LCR and use other independent variables, bank specific and macroeconomic variables are 
used. 
Equation # 06 
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In equation 6 the capital ratios, Equity to total asset (ETA) and CAR, one of the structure liquidity ratio 
LCR and use other independent variables, bank specific and macroeconomic variables are used for the 
regression. 
 
Different equations are used to check the relation of the BASEL lll framework with Failure and Distress 
of the banks. In this research not only the Basel lll variables (NSFR, LCR) are used, but also the other 
determinants of the failure and distress are studied. 
 
3.4 Identify failure and distress banks 
The identification process starts with the Z-Score as can assign the status to the banks with the help of Z-
Score. A bank is classified as a failed and distressed (F&D) if it satisfies the ratio 1.1 or below the ratio. 
The main ratios are formulated from the banks’ annual reports that are publicly published statement 
andtaken from the state bank of Pakistan.  Data is also taken from the official website of the banks, 
financial institutions and internet. This research work uses the financial data from 2010 to 2015. (R, 
Pradhan 2014) 
 
The investor takes best snapshot of the corporate financial health from the Z-score. One of the other ratios 
that are used for the formulation of the bank status either the bank is financially distress or not is Altman 
Z-score as it is a measure that is used for the probability of the bankruptcy. The Altman Z-score is based 
on these ratios that are given below:  
 
3.5 Z score Formula  
T1 = (Current Assets-Current Liabilities) / Total Assets  
T2 = Retained Earnings / Total Assets  
T3 = Earnings before Interest and Taxes / Total Assets  
T4 = Book Value of Equity / Total Liabilities 
Z-Score Bankruptcy Model:      
Z = 6.56T1 + 3.26T2 + 6.72T3 + 1.05T4  
Zones of Discrimination: Z < 1.1 - “Distress” Zone, Z> 1.1 “Active” Zone 
 
Table 1 
 
 
Bank 
Name 
 
 
Years 
No. of 
distress 
year 
Total 
active 
year 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015     
F &D Active  F &D Active  F &D Active  F &D Active  F &D Active  F &D Active      
Allied 
bank 1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   
6 0 
Bank al 
Habib 1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   
6 0 
Askari 
bank 1.000   1.000     0.000 1.000   1.000   1.000   
5 1 
Bank 
Islamic   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 
0 6 
bank of 
Khyber 1.000   1.000   1.000     0.000   0.000 1.000   
4 2 
Faysal 
bank 1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   
6 0 
Habib 
bank   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 
0 6 
JS bank   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 1.000   1 5 
Meezan 1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000     0.000   0.000 4 2 
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This table shows the detail of the bank’s failure and distress level according to the year. It shows that how 
many years one bank faced failure and distressed condition.  The bank is considered fail and distressed if 
the value of the bank’s Z-score is below 1.1 and the other banks whose values are greater than 1.1 then the 
bank is considered as an active bank. Last two columns show the details of the banks either they are the 
active or distressed and how many years one banks suffer the failure and distress.  
 
3.5 Capital and liquidity indicator 
Basel lll capital and structure liquidity standards are main target variables. To measure bank capital, 
different ratios are computed, a non-risk weighted leverage ratio equal to the equity to total asset, and two 
risk-based measure Tier 1 capital ratios (defined as the ratio of tier 1 capital dividing by the risk weighted 
asset), and total regulatory capital ratio (defined as the ratio of tier 1 and tier 2 capital to risk weighted 
asset), denoted  by the TIER1RATIO and CAR respectively.  These proxies are broadly used in the 
literature (Betz et al., 2014; Mayes and Stremmel, 2014; Vazquez and Federico, 2015). The relation of 
these ratios with the F&D is expected to be negative if these ratios ETA (Equity to total asset), 
TIER1RATIO and TRCR leads to decrease in the Failure and Distress probability.  
 
For the computation of the structural liquidity ratio, two versions are calculated: NSFR 2014, based on the 
latest version of the Basel lll in October 2014, and NSFR 2010, based on the original documents of 
December 2010 and other important liquidity coverage ratio (LCR). Annual reports of the Pakistani banks 
do not cover all the information that are required in the Basel lll documents. The following assumptions 
are made while computing NSFR 
 
According to the Basel lllthe loan portfolio of the residual maturity cannot be divided because the Basel 
lll require different weights, corporate and retail loans are preserved relatively conservatively ( Gobat et 
al., 2014), with all these types of loans it is assumed that the loans have maturity of more than 1 year and 
hence a RSF weight of 85 percent. There is an expected negative relation between the structure liquidity 
measure and the probability of bank failure and distress, whereby a higher NSFR is associated with lower 
liquidity risk and hence greater bank stability.   
 
Formula table 
bank 
NBP   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 0 6 
Smbabank   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 1.000   1 5 
Sindh 
bank   0.000   0.000 1.000     0.000   0.000 1.000   
2 4 
Summit 
bank  1.000   1.000   1.000     0.000   0.000 1.000   
4 2 
 UBL bank   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 0 6 
ZTBL   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 0 6 
MCB 
bank   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 1.000     0.000 
1 5 
BANK 
alflah   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 1.000     0.000 
1 5 
BOP   0.000   0.000 1.000     0.000   0.000   0.000 1 5 
burj bank   0.000   0.000 1.000     0.000 1.000     0.000 2 4 
soneri 
bank  1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   
6 0 
Silk bank   0.000   0.000   0.000 1.000     0.000   0.000 1 5 
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3.6 Other determinants of bank failure  
Different variables are considered as a predictor of the bank failure. The studies investigating the bank 
failure used different determinants, one of the most powerful predictor of the bank failure is CAMELS 
indicators (Betz et al., 2104, Saba et al., 2012, 2015, kouser et al., 2011, 2012, 2016).  
. In this paper the non-performing loan to gross loan (NPL-GL) in the place of asset quality is used. This 
ratio shows the quality of the loan portfolio. If this ratio is high, it means the quality of the bank portfolio 
is low and the higher ratio of (NPL-GL) increase the chances of the probability bank failure and distress. 
Next, added another ratio namely cost-to-income ratio use as a proxy of bank operational efficiency. This 
CIR ratio show the managerial quality of the banks if the ratio is low it indicates the better managerial 
quality, the expected relation between the CIR and probability of bank failure and distress is positive. 
 
To measure bank earning t the return on average assets (ROAA) is used.  The expected relation between 
the ROAA and banks probability of failure and distress is negative. The higher the ROAA ratio decrease 
the probability of failure. In addition, a set of control variables to the CAMELS covariates are included in 
the studyRatio of non-interest income to operating revenue as a proxy for the diversification (DIV) is used 
and the relationship between DIV and probability of failure and distress is negative. DIV indicates the 
reduction of the risk and therefore it leads to decrease the failure and distress of the banks.  
 
The natural logarithm of the banks total assets is used as a substitution of the bank size (SIZE). The 
relation of SIZE and probability of bank failure and distress is uncertain. Because the SIZE of banks 
effects differently on the failure and distress. The relationship can be negative when the growth of the 
assets leads to the efficiency gain (scale and scope efficiency), which should lead to higher bank stability. 
 
On the other hand, the relationship between the diversification strategies and the risk exposure is expected 
to positive and with the volatility of earning (Allen and Jagtiani, 2000) (DeYoung and Roland, 2001; 
DeJonghe, 2010; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). In addition to bank specific control, the study 
focusses on measure of market concentration and macroeconomic variables (Männasoo and Mayes, 2009; 
Betz et al., 2014). We include the annual inflation rate (INF) and annual percentage change of gross 
domestic product (GDPC). It is estimated that the high inflation rate and low GDP increase bank 
vulnerability. 
 
Banking system concentration also effects on the stability of the banks and effects on the failure and 
distress of the banks. banking system concentration can be assessed Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(hereafter HHI). The HHI is considered as the sum of the squared market share value (in term of total 
assets) of all banks in the country. The hypothetical relationship linking HHI to bank survival is 
undefined.  Certain studies emphasis on bank obligations and forecast a negative relationship between 
market concentration and banks’ risk of failure (see Allen and Gale, 2000, 2004; Carletti, 2008; Beck et 
al., 2013). 
 
Table # 2 
Variables Definition 
ETA Equity to total Asset 
TIER1RATIO The ratio of tier1 capital to risk weighted assets 
TRCR The ratio of tier1 and tier 2 capital to risk weighted assets. 
NSFR2014 
The ratio of available stable funding to require stable funding as defined by the new final Basel III 
version of October 2014.  
NSFR2010 
The ratio of available stable funding to require stable funding as defined by the new final Basel III 
version of October 2014.  
                                      Other determinants of bank failure and distress  
ROAA The ratio of net income to average total assets.  
CIR Cost-to-income ratio is calculated by dividing the operating expense by the operating income. 
NPL_GL The ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans 
Journal of Accounting and Finance in Emerging Economies   Vol. 3, No 1, June 2017 
 
 
10 
 
DIV The ratio of non-interest income to net operating revenue.  
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets. 
GDPC The annual percentage change of GDP 
INFC The annual percentage change of inflation 
HHI The sum of the squared market share value (in term of total assets) of all Banks in the country. 
 
This table shows the detail of the variables and the definition of the variables. This table also help us to 
calculate the variables.  
   Table # 03 
     NSFR Calculation 
This table summarizes the weights for each asset and liability items used to compute the last version of 
the NSFR of October 2014 and the previous version December 2010. NSFR computed as the ratio of 
(ASF) to (RSF).  
ASF factor Bank Scope Liability & Equity Items ASF factor Bank Scope Liability & Equity Items 
2014 2010 
100% Total equity 100% Total equity 
 
Total long-term funding 
 
Total long-term funding 
95% Customer deposits savings and terms 90% Customer deposits savings and terms 
90% Customer deposits current 80% Customer deposits current 
50% Other deposits and short-term  borrowings 50% Other deposits and short-term borrowings 
0% Deposits from banks 0% Deposits from banks 
RSF factor Bank Scope Asset Items RSF factor Bank Scope Asset Items 
2014 2010 
0% Cash and due from banks 0% Cash and due from banks 
 
  
 
Loans and advance to banks 
5% Government Securities 5% Government Securities 
50% Other securities  50% Other securities  
 
Loans and advance to banks 
 
65% Residential mortgage loans 65% 
 
Residential mortgage loans 
85% Net loans 85% Net loans 
 
– residential mortgage loans 
 
– residential mortgage loans 
 
Reserve for impaired loans/NPLs 
 
Reserve for impaired loans/NPLs 
 
Non-earning assets (=total assets – total 
 
Non-earning assets (=total assets – total 
 
earning assets – cash and due from banks) 
 
earning assets – cash and due from banks) 
 
Fixed assets 
 
Fixed assets 
100% Other earning assets 100% Other earning assets 
 
Insurance assets 
 
Insurance assets 
 
Investments in property 
 
Investments in property 
 
At-equity investments in associates 
 
At-equity investments in associates 
5% Off-balance sheet items 5% Off-balance sheet items 
 
This table shows the weights of the specific variable that will helpful for the calculation of the NSFR-14 
and NSFR-10. In this table clear the difference between the NSFR10 and NSFR-14 according to their 
weights and calculation.  
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4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
This section describes the descriptive statistics of the variables. The table reports the descriptive statistics 
of Capital variable for both active and Failure and distress banks. The proxies that are used for the Capital 
ratios are the (ETA, CAR and TIER1RATIO). All the variables are winsorised by 5 percent. According to 
the descriptive statistics of the capital variables shows that the mean value of the failure and distress 
banks of the ETA, CAR and TIER1RATIO are always less as compared to the active banks. The mean 
value of the capital ratio of the active banks is always higher. We consider the banks failure and distress if 
the banks Z-Score ratio is less than 1.1. The banks that have the Z-Score value more than 1.1 then it will 
be consider as an active and efficient bank.  All the banks are categorized according to the ratio of the Z-
Score.  
 
Table # 04 
Summary statistics of the Capital ratios of bank F&D by bank status  
Variables  F&D Banks Active banks  
 
Mean ST.d Min Max Mean ST.d Min Max 
ETA 0.0775 0.0372912 0.048019 0.2597636 0.120568 0.061376 0.048019 0.259764 
CAR 0.1282 0.040774 0.05352 0.2704954 0.214798 0.135112 0.05352 0.526128 
TIER1RATIO 0.1019 0.0286306 0.046109 0.1707572 0.19546 0.139305 0.046109 0.524266 
 
Table reports the descriptive statistics of our Structural Liquidity for both active and Failure and distress 
banks. The proxies that are used for the Structural Liquidity ratios are the (NSFR both version, NSFR14 
and NSFR10). All the variables are winsorised by 5 percent. According to the descriptive statistics of the 
Liquidity variables shows that the mean value of the failure and distress banks of the NSFR14 and 
NSFR10 are always less as compared to the active banks. The mean value of the Liquidity ratio of the 
active banks is always higher. We consider the banks failure and distress if the banks Z-Score ratio is less 
than 1.1. The banks that have the Z-Score value more than 1.1 then it will be consider as an active and 
efficient bank. So, we differentiate all the banks according to the ratio of the Z-Score. 
     Table # 05 
Summary statistics of the Liquidity ratios of bank F&D by bank status  
Variables  F&D Banks Active banks  
  Mean ST.d Min Max Mean ST.d Min Max 
NSFR14 1.8527 0.581491 1.140491 2.930967 1.993036 0.456115 1.140491 2.930967 
NSFR10 1.7506 0.5424526 1.084636 2.796657 1.914961 0.451773 1.084636 2.796657 
 
Table reports the descriptive statistics of the other variable for both active and Failure and distress banks. 
All the variables are winsorised by 5 percent. According to the descriptive statistics of the other variables 
shows that the mean value of the failure and distress banks of the other variables are always less as 
compared to the active banks. The mean value of the Liquidity ratio of the active banks is always higher. 
We consider the banks failure and distress if the banks Z-Score ratio is less than 1.1 . The banks that have 
the Z-Score value more than 1.1 then it will be consider as an active and efficient bank. So, we 
differentiate all the banks according to the ratio of the Z-Score. 
 
Table # 06 
Summary Statistics of the other determinants of bank F&D by bank status  
Variables  F&D Banks Active banks  
  Mean ST.d Min Max Mean ST.d Min Max 
ROA-1 0.006 0.0095219 -0.0138 0.0201 0.009242 0.010105 -0.0138 0.0263 
SIZE-1 11.486 0.3325036 10.77733 12.19024 11.3751 0.533141 10.54225 12.19024 
DIV-1 0.3171 0.1318417 0.122138 0.591413 0.285919 0.120761 0.107033 0.591413 
CIR-1 0.7001 0.1823827 0.354364 0.9766772 0.636651 0.174938 0.354364 0.976677 
HHI-1 18888 61.89044 18790.75 18971.01 18888.26 61.36668 18790.75 18971.01 
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INF-1 -0.205 0.2159774 -0.6493 0.0170943 -0.2045 0.21415 -0.6493 0.017094 
GDP-1 0.0366 0.0053467 0.025805 0.0423916 0.036599 0.005302 0.025805 0.042392 
 
 
 
Table # 07 
 
This Table reports the descriptive statistics of the target variable (ETA, TIER1RATIO and CAR) by bank 
status (Failure & distress and active banks) and by year. In this table also shows that the average value of 
the active banks is higher as compared to the failure and distress banks. All the variables are winsorised 
by 5 percent. We consider the banks failure and distress if the banks Z-Score ratio is less than 1.1 . The 
banks that have the Z-Score value more than 1.1 then it will be consider as an active and efficient bank. 
So, we differentiate all the banks according to the ratio of the Z-Score. 
  
  
ACTIVE 
BANKS F&D BANKS 
ACTIVE 
BANKS F&D BANKS 
ACTIVE 
BANKS F&D BANKS 
ye
ar 
ETA TIER1RATIO CAR 
Mean Min-
Max 
Mean Min-
Max 
Mean Min-
Max 
Mean Min-
Max 
Mean Min-
Max 
Mean Min-
Max 
(Std. 
Dev) 
  (Std. 
Dev) 
  (Std. 
Dev) 
    (Std. 
Dev) 
  (Std. 
Dev) 
  (Std. 
Dev) 
  
20
10 
0.135 
0.0
52 
0.2
19 
0.084 
0.0
52 
0.1
85 
0.178 
0.0
66 
0.4
33 0.103 
0.0
66 
0.1
58 0.197 
0.0
78 
0.4
34 
0.122 
0.0
78 
0.1
66 
0.060     0.043     0.124     0.031     0.117     0.027     
20
11 
0.131 
0.0
52 
0.2
19 
0.083 
0.0
52 
0.1
51 
0.183 
0.0
66 
0.4
33 0.150 
0.0
66 
0.4
33 0.197 
0.0
78 
0.4
34 
0.169 
0.0
78 
0.4
34 
0.061     0.033     0.122     0.120     0.117     0.113     
20
12 
0.117 
0.0
56 
0.2
19 
0.088 
0.0
52 
0.1
43 
0.167 
0.0
66 
0.4
33 0.174 
0.0
66 
0.4
33 0.190 
0.0
78 
0.4
34 
0.188 
0.0
78 
0.4
34 
0.058     0.033     0.102     0.131     0.097     0.125     
20
13 
0.119 
0.0
52 
0.2
19 
0.069 
0.0
52 
0.0
93 
0.183 
0.0
66 
0.4
33 0.151 
0.0
66 
0.4
33 0.198 
0.0
78 
0.4
34 
0.168 
0.0
78 
0.4
34 
0.052     0.017     0.117     0.127     0.115     0.122     
20
14 
0.109 
0.0
52 
0.2
19 
0.104 
0.0
53 
0.2
19 
0.174 
0.0
66 
0.4
33 0.132 
0.0
87 
0.2
05 0.201 
0.0
78 
0.4
34 
0.158 
0.1
22 
0.2
08 
0.054     0.058     0.125     0.044     0.118     0.038     
20
15 
0.098 
0.0
52 
0.2
19 
0.085 
0.0
52 
0.1
48 
0.157 
0.0
87 
0.4
33 0.168 
0.0
87 
0.4
33 0.178 
0.0
9 
0.4
34 
0.214 
0.1 
0.4
34 
0.048     0.030     0.096     0.102     0.090     0.104     
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Table # 08 
This Table reports the descriptive statistics of the target variable (NSFR14 & NSFR10) by bank status 
(Failure & distress and active banks) and by year. In this table also shows that the average value of the 
active banks is higher as compared to the failure and distress banks. All the variables are winsorised by 5 
percent. We consider the bank failure and distress if the banks Z-Score ratio is less than 1.1 . The banks 
that have the Z-Score value more than 1.1 then it will be consider as an active and efficient bank. So, we 
differentiate all the banks, according to the ratio of the Z-Score. 
  
  
ACTIVE 
BANKS F&D BANKS 
ACTIVE 
BANKS F&D BANKS 
ACTIVE 
BANKS F&D BANKS 
ye
ar 
NSFR-14 NSFR-10 LCR 
Mean Min-
Max 
Mean Min-
Max 
Mean Min-
Max 
Mean Min-
Max 
Mean Min-
Max 
Mean Min-
Max 
(Std. 
Dev) 
  (Std. 
Dev) 
  (Std. 
Dev) 
    (Std. 
Dev) 
  (Std. 
Dev) 
  (Std. 
Dev) 
  
20
10 
1.307
5 
0.6
85 
1.8
75 
0.983
9 
0.3
2 
1.4
24 
1.247
6 
0.6
29 
1.9
46 
0.930
9 
0.2
82 
1.3
49 
0.090
1 
0.0
7 
0.1
07 
0.070
9 
0.0
61 
0.0
83 
0.354
0 
    0.340
8 
    0.374
0 
    0.349
4 
    0.011
4 
    0.009
1 
    
20
11 
1.321
3 
0.7
45 
1.9
66 
1.143
8 
0.5
69 
1.5
19 
1.220
3 
0.6
92 
1.8
28 
1.059
5 
0.5
25 
1.4
05 
0.105
6 
0.0
61 
0.1
57 
0.097
4 
0.0
66 
0.1
39 
0.319
8 
    0.287
1 
    0.299
2 
    0.265
7 
    0.036
1 
    0.026
8 
    
20
12 
1.386
6 
0.6
4 
1.8
76 
1.173
9 
0.3
86 
1.7
65 
1.302
4 
0.5
85 
1.8
2 
1.085
8 
0.3
14 
1.6
54 
0.113
7 
0.0
69 
0.1
57 
0.078
4 
0.0
62 
0.0
98 
0.395
9 
    0.499
6 
    0.380
8 
    0.484
1 
    0.029
4 
    0.013
0 
    
20
13 
1.393
5 
0.9
47 
1.7
77 
1.167
0 
0.5
4 
1.6
07 
1.353
1 
0.9
01 
1.9
91 
1.049
4 
0.4
32 
1.4
76 
0.102
1 
0.0
61 
0.1
57 
0.091
0 
0.0
61 
0.1
29 
0.298
7 
    0.379
4 
    0.337
5 
    0.363
3 
    0.035
5 
    0.021
1 
    
20
14 
1.426
0 
0.6
42 
1.9
33 
1.392
9 
0.3
12 
1.9 1.342
1 
0.5
9 
1.8
09 
1.309
9 
0.3
09 
1.8
45 
0.099
2 
0.0
61 
0.1
57 
0.092
5 
0.0
64 
0.1
16 
0.3k2
155 
    0.565
4 
    0.299
9 
    0.530
1 
    0.030
7 
    0.018
2 
    
20
15 
1.305
5 
0.7
3 
1.7
6 
1.520
5 
1.2
21 
1.9
52 
1.218
5 
0.6
6 
1.6
5 
1.420
4 
1.1
16 
1.8
76 
0.087
2 
0.0
68 
0.1
57 
0.078
1 
0.0
61 
0.0
97 
0.316
0     
0.282
3 
    0.301
3     
0.286
1 
    0.025
2 
    0.011
1 
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Table reports the descriptive statistics of the our all variable for both active and Failure and distress banks. 
All the variables are winsorised by 5 percent. According to the descriptive statistics of the variables shows 
that the average value of the failure and distress banks of the other variables are always less as compared 
to the active banks. The mean value of the variable of the active banks is always higher. We consider the 
bank failure and distress if the banks Z-Score ratio is less than 1.1 . The banks that have the Z-Score value 
more than 1.1 then it will be considered as an active and efficient bank. So, we differentiate all the banks, 
according to the ratio of the Z-Score. 
 
     Table # 09 
 
Summary statistics full sample of the bank  
Variables  Full Sample 
  Mean ST.d Min Max 
ETA 0.1082632 0.058763 0.0480185 0.2597636 
TIER1RATIO 0.1687345 0.1258825 0.046109 0.5242656 
CAR 0.1900586 0.1224972 0.0535196 0.5261277 
NSFR14 1.952944 0.4968423 1.140491 2.930967 
NSFR10 1.86799 0.4829801 1.084636 2.796657 
LCR 0.0934981 0.026766 0.061304 0.1566313 
ROA-1 0.0083238 0.0100107 -0.0138 0.0263 
Size-1 11.40683 0.485666 10.54225 12.19024 
DIV-1 0.2948256 0.1242988 0.1070327 0.591413 
Cir-1 0.6547783 0.1786939 0.3543644 0.9766772 
Hhi-1 18888.26 61.26841 18790.75 18971.01 
Inflation-1 -0.2045012 0.2138067 -0.6492968 0.0170943 
Gdp-1 0.0365994 0.005293 0.0258051 0.0423916 
 
4.2 Correlation 
 
Table # 10 
 
ETA TIER1 CAR NSFR14 NSFR10 ROA SIZE DIV CIR HHI INF GDP LCR 
ETA 1 
            TIER1R 
ATIO 0.52 1.00 
           CAR 0.50 0.98 1.00 
          NSFR14 -0.03 0.01 0.02 1.00 
         NSFR10 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.98 1.00 
        ROA 0.09 0.02 0.08 0.39 0.42 1.00 
       SIZE -0.49 -0.40 -0.32 0.26 0.26 0.52 1.00 
      DIV -0.23 -0.36 -0.35 -0.17 -0.17 -0.18 0.07 1.00 
     CIR -0.08 0.08 0.04 -0.27 -0.31 -0.51 -0.40 0.05 1.00 
    HHI 0.12 -0.01 -0.06 -0.27 -0.29 -0.05 -0.26 -0.05 0.06 1.00 
   INF 0.14 -0.02 -0.06 -0.22 -0.23 -0.04 -0.21 -0.05 0.07 0.75 1.00 
  GDP -0.11 0.04 0.07 0.23 0.26 0.10 0.22 -0.03 -0.05 -0.84 -0.66 1.00 
 LCR 0.16 -0.06 -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.29 0.29 0.00 -0.04 0.26 0.15 -0.22 1.00 
 
This table shows the result of the correlation matrix for our variables of interest (Capital and Liquidity 
ratios) and the other explanatory variables. There are many variables that have the pairwise correlation 
coefficient is statistically significant. Some of the variables has the multicollinearity so we run regression 
separate from those variables that have the multicollinearity. The magnitude of the correlation is low.  
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4.3 Result 
In this research,  the dependent variableis the dummy variable and logistic regression is used. We run the 
logit regression for the period of the 2010-2015. Due to multicollinearity we run different logistic 
regression and to find that which combination of the variable are best suitable for the stability of the 
banks. For example, we run the regression with the different independent variable version (NSFR14 & 
NSFR10) to check whether the NSFR 14 is better explained as compare to the NSFR10 
 
Table # 11 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
NSFR14 -0.931828 0.558769 -1.667643 0.0954 
TIER1RATIO -7.314482 8.310542 -0.880145 0.3788 
NPLGL-1 -7.908628 4.151151 -1.905165 0.0568 
CIR-1 1.420907 1.417719 1.002249 0.3162 
SIZE-1 -0.327107 0.613390 -0.533278 0.5938 
DIV-1 0.975108 2.352845 0.414438 0.6786 
HHI-1 5.80E-05 0.003302 0.017564 0.9860 
ROA-1 -5.799769 31.68397 -0.183051 0.8548 
ETA -12.87970 4.787060 -2.690524 0.0071 
C 3.546427 64.37960 0.055086 0.9561 
R
2   
0.070175 
 
This table shows the result of the equation 01 in this equation the relation between our main target 
variable (NSFR14) and dependent variable (failure and distress) is negative. It means when the value of 
the NSFR increase then the probability of bank failure and distress will decrease, and the result are also 
significant. The relation between the failure and distress with the other independent variable are positive 
as well as the negative. Some variables have the negative relation with the dependent variable (F&D). 
Equity to total asset (ETA),TIER1RATIO, SIZE, ROA and NPL_GL have negative relation with the 
Failure and Distress. The value of these variables increases the probability of bank failure and distress 
will decrease.  The other remaining variable has the positive relation with the bank failure and distress. 
 
Table # 12 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
NSFR14 -0.936935 0.560722 -1.670942 0.0947 
GDP-1 5.971241 53.19839 0.112245 0.9106 
INFLATION-1 -0.320031 1.205798 -0.265410 0.7907 
CIR-1 1.205155 1.306239 0.922615 0.3562 
DIV-1 1.054569 2.282231 0.462078 0.6440 
NPLGL-1 -5.226842 4.341065 -1.204046 0.2286 
CAR 0.731003 2.557082 0.285874 0.7750 
SIZE-1 -0.312582 0.505378 -0.618512 0.5362 
ETA -13.89541 5.507982 -2.522776 0.0116 
ROA-1 -4.357626 30.36809 -0.143494 0.8859 
C 1.284275 2.066897 0.621354 0.5344 
R
2      
0.065819 
 
This table shows the result of the equation 02 in this equation the relation between our main target 
variable (NSFR14) and dependent variable (failure and distress) is negative. It means when the value of 
the NSFR increase then the probability of bank failure and distress will decrease, and the result are also 
significant . The relation between the failure and distress with the other independent variable are positive 
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as well as the negative. Some variables have the negative relation with the dependent variable (F&D). 
Equity to total asset (ETA),TIER1RATIO, SIZE, ROA and NPL_GL have negative relation with the 
Failure and Distress. The value of these variables increases the probability of bank failure and distress 
will decrease.  The other remaining variable has the positive relation with the bank failure and distress. 
       
Table # 13 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
NSFR10 -0.968212 0.571902 -1.692967 0.0905 
ETA -13.56505 5.566633 -2.436850 0.0148 
GDP-1 4.927823 65.37302 0.075380 0.9399 
INFLATION-1 -0.336637 1.405577 -0.239501 0.8107 
CIR-1 1.174806 1.309324 0.897261 0.3696 
DIV-1 1.073025 2.314007 0.463709 0.6429 
ROA-1 6.041435 34.17366 0.176786 0.8597 
SIZE-1 -0.425016 0.751988 -0.565189 0.5719 
NPLGL-1 -5.278053 4.259141 -1.239229 0.2153 
TIER1RATIO 0.607946 2.482384 0.244904 0.8065 
C 1.161977 77.42945 0.015007 0.9880 
R
2         
0.146356 
 
This table shows the result of the equation 03 in this equation the relation between our main target 
variable (NSFR10) and dependent variable (failure and distress) is negative. It means when the value of 
the NSFR increase then the probability of bank failure and distress will decrease, and the result are also 
significant. The relation between the failure and distress with the other independent variable are positive 
as well as the negative. Some variables have the negative relation with the dependent variable (F&D). 
Equity to total asset (ETA),TIER1RATIO, SIZE, ROA and NPL_GL have negative relation with the 
Failure and Distress. The value of these variables increases the probability of bank failure and distress 
will decrease.  The other remaining variable has the positive relation with the bank failure and distress. 
 
Table # 14 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
NSFR10 -0.939774 0.558718 -1.682021 0.0926 
ETA -14.00486 5.461270 -2.564396 0.0103 
CAR 0.901253 2.552318 0.353112 0.7240 
HHI-1 -1.74E-06 0.003322 -0.000524 0.9996 
ROA-1 -3.985586 31.43058 -0.126806 0.8991 
SIZE-1 -0.274759 0.586934 -0.468126 0.6397 
CIR-1 1.193727 1.297582 0.919962 0.3576 
DIV-1 1.002895 2.276412 0.440559 0.6595 
NPLGL-1 -5.199571 4.294914 -1.210634 0.2260 
C 1.532056 62.69899 0.024435 0.9805 
R
2
 0.144817 
  
This table shows the result of the equation 04 in this equation the relation between our main target 
variable (NSFR10) and dependent variable (failure and distress) is negative. It means when the value of 
the NSFR increase then the probability of bank failure and distress will decrease, and the result are also 
significant. The relation between the failure and distress with the other independent variable are positive 
as well as the negative. Some variables have the negative relation with the dependent variable (F&D). 
Equity to total asset (ETA),TIER1RATIO, SIZE, ROA and NPL_GL have negative relation with the 
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Failure and Distress. The value of these variables increases the probability of bank failure and distress 
will decrease.  The other remaining variable has the positive relation with the bank failure and distress. 
 
      Table # 15 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
LCR -22.71415 11.22822 -2.022951 0.0431 
ETA -15.37601 6.197637 -2.480948 0.0131 
TIER1RATIO -0.227287 2.515377 -0.090359 0.9280 
GDP-1 14.55497 55.06428 0.264327 0.7915 
INFLATION-1 0.329672 1.284395 0.256675 0.7974 
CIR-1 0.970828 1.640355 0.591840 0.5540 
DIV-1 0.200833 2.335936 0.085976 0.9315 
NPLGL-1 -2.852812 4.482579 -0.636422 0.5245 
ROA-1 7.804629 34.24753 0.227889 0.8197 
SIZE-1 -0.461073 0.758779 -0.607651 0.5434 
C 7.565057 9.323747 0.811375 0.4172 
R
2
 0.145054 
 
This table shows the result of the equation 05 in this equation the relation between our main target 
variable (LCR) and dependent variable (failure and distress) is negative. It means when the value of the 
LCR increase then the probability of bank failure and distress will decrease, and the result are also 
significant. The relation between the failure and distress with the other independent variable are positive 
as well as the negative. Some variables have the negative relation with the dependent variable (F&D). 
Equity to total asset (ETA),TIER1RATIO, SIZE, ROA and NPL_GL have negative relation with the 
Failure and Distress. The value of these variables increases the probability of bank failure and distress 
will decrease.  The other remaining variable has the positive relation with the bank failure and distress. 
 
     Table # 16 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
LCR -24.52157 11.60674 -2.112700 0.0346 
ETA -15.46547 6.286931 -2.459939 0.0139 
CIR-1 0.973561 1.642346 0.592787 0.5533 
DIV-1 0.421860 2.327933 0.181217 0.8562 
NPLGL-1 -2.924110 4.601039 -0.635533 0.5251 
ROA-1 3.482840 34.10437 0.102123 0.9187 
SIZE-1 -0.279990 0.805269 -0.347698 0.7281 
CAR 0.575452 2.572291 0.223712 0.8230 
HHI-1 0.002224 0.003837 0.579643 0.5622 
C -36.02922 76.39003 -0.471648 0.6372 
R
2
 0.146591 
 
This table shows the result of the equation 06 in this equation the relation between our main target 
variable (LCR) and dependent variable (failure and distress) is negative. It means when the value of the 
LCR increase then the probability of bank failure and distress will decrease, and the result are also 
significant. The relation between the failure and distress with the other independent variable are positive 
as well as the negative. Some variables have the negative relation with the dependent variable (F&D). 
Equity to total asset (ETA),TIER1RATIO, SIZE, ROA and NPL_GL have negative relation with the 
Failure and Distress. The value of these variables increases the probability of bank failure and distress 
will decrease.  The other remaining variable has the positive relation with the bank failure and distress. 
In this analysis, we take lagged all the other independent variables. Lagged is used for checking the 
Journal of Accounting and Finance in Emerging Economies   Vol. 3, No 1, June 2017 
 
 
18 
 
impact of the previous year on the current year. There is autocorrelation exist in this data, so we used 
lagged values to eliminate the Autocorrelation.   
 
4.4 Regression Result & Discussion 
All the above tables show the result of the logistic regression. We run the models on the main variables 
and other determinants of the bank failure and distress variables. In all the model we use the dummy 
variable as a dependent variable. In our result, among the main target variable only the NSFR and the 
LCR is significant determinants of bank failure and distress. The results of the study are in line with the 
earlier studies(Laura, 2016), (King 2013), (Huiliar, 2014).  
 
Our result confirms the hypothesis. There is negative relation between the NSFR and the Failure and 
Distress of the banks. The negative relation explains that higher the value of the NSFR will lead to lower 
the probability of bank failure and distress. Hong et al. (2014) find that the impact of the NSFR on the 
European banking industry is limited but my result tells that there is highly significant relation with the 
NSFR and the probability of bank failure and distress. 
 
The result of the capital variables (ETA, TIER1RATIO and CAR) are not significant. And there are many 
researches that show the result that the capital ratios are never significant (Laura,2016). 
 
The results of the study show that liquidity and capital ratios do not play an important role in the stability 
of the banks. The research found that the banking industry not only focus on the  stability by the capital 
and liquidity ratios, but the other activities also have an impact on the stability of the banks. To be more 
exact there is an inverse relation between the Diversification and the bank failure and distress. Other 
variables (NPL-GL, SIZE and ROA) also inversely related to the probability of bank failure and distress. 
But the ROA and CIR are not significant in our result. The macroeconomic variables (GDP and INF) also 
determinants of the bank failure and distress. GDP growth leads to the decrease the inflation and improve 
the economic condition of the country that leads to decrease the probability of bank failure and distress. 
 
Additionally,  the relation of the market concentration on the failure and distress of the banks is also 
studied. Table 14 shows that there is negative relationship between market concentration and probability 
of bank failure and distress. It means that the banks which has a more market concentration has less 
probability of failure and distress. The result become positive when the macroeconomic variables were 
added in the regression analysis. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The banking industry is the backbone of the economy of any country. Failure of the banks has a very 
negative impact on the economy. The global financial crisis 2007 - 2009 highlighted the reasons of the 
failure of the banks. The main reason of the failure of the banks is the risk of maturity mismatch and 
unstable funding mix on the banks’ balance sheet. Which reveals that there is a need to change 
supervisory and regulatory framework for governing the bank liquidity.The Basel lll reduce the bank 
failure and promote the stability of banks by using the joint role of structural liquidity and capital ratios. 
 
According to  results of the study the requirement of the BCBS is satisfied with the Net Stable Funding 
Ratio. It is found that the capital and liquidity ratios play important role in the stability of banks and 
reduce the failure and distress of the banks. Our result also indicates that the banks that have the lower 
structural liquidity ratios and capital ratios, these banks faces difficulties. Analysis result is valuable 
particularly in the present debate on the effects of interest to academics and decision-makers that the Bank 
of Basel III capital structure and liquidity cushion to enhance stability.       
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